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A federal court has long been able to adjudicate a claim for which jurisdiction
did not exist by statute, so long as the claim had the right relation to another
claim in the case that was authorized by statute. Until 1990, this important
category of law (termed "extended" or "supplemental" jurisdiction) was governed
by a group of federal court doctrines ("ancillary," "pendent," or "pendent party"
jurisdiction). Then, Congress codified the area through enactment of the federal
supplemental-jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
With that event, perhaps all federal trial jurisdiction in civil cases became
statutory. Yet § 1367 is indefinite in a way unlike other jurisdictional statutes
(e.g., federal question claims under § 1331, diversity claims under § 1332). This
is because prior doctrinal law, that Congress sought in large part to replicate, was
itself indefinite.
Experiences to date invite a number of questions about the meaning and relative
desirability of § 1367. Questions about meaning include these: How much of the
law settled prior to § 1367 did the statute preserve through codification? How
much did the statute change? Insofar as important issues concerning federal
supplemental jurisdiction were unsettled prior to enactment of § 1367, did the
statute resolve them? Or does the statute provide means for resolving them yet
unrealized?
Questions about desirability include these: Was complete codification of
federal supplemental jurisdiction necessary or wise? Even if it was not, is it
possible today to return the subject to a state of nonstatutory, doctrinal law? If
codification is now the only practical possibility, is § 1367 the best Congress can
do? If not, how should the statute be revised or replaced?
In our Symposium, many of the country's leading civil procedure scholars bring
their energies to bear on these and other questions.
In the first Symposium article, Professor Richard D. Freer examines the
operation of § 1367 and criticizes the manner in which it restricts plaintiffs acting
in a defensive capacity and restricts claims by or against intervenors of right.' In
the next article, Professor John B. Oakley provides an inside look at the American
Law Institute's current initiative to rewrite the statute and offers some of his own
views on supplemental jurisdiction.2 Then, Professor Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. writes
on the practical necessity of codification for supplemental jurisdiction and offers
a draft revision of § 1367.3 In our final article, Professor Joan Steinman carefully
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studies a number of questions that arise from the interplay of § 1367 with federal
removal statutes.4
In the first of a series of comments that follow, Professor Robert G. Bone
reflects on the political pragmatism of legislative reform proposals for
supplemental jurisdiction and finds a useful distinction between "optional" and
"nonoptional" jurisdiction.' Next, Professor Edward H. Cooper warns against
attempts to reform supplemental jurisdiction through detailed codification; he
offers a legislative proposal that would reintroduce significant judicial
lawmaking.6 Professor Howard P. Fink views possibilities for improving
supplemental jurisdiction through congressional abrogation of the complete-
diversity requirement in Strawbridge v. Curtiss.!
Then, Professor William A. Fletcher considers how a historical examination of
multiclaim litigation at the time the Constitution was adopted might inform a
better understanding of the role the Constitution could now play in allowing
supplemental jurisdiction.8 Next, Professor Graham C. Lilly reflects upon the
causes of the unfortunate "capture" of the subject of supplemental jurisdiction by
Congress and describes how a new statute might restore the balance in lawmaking
between Congress and the courts.9 Professor Peter Raven-Hansen then identifies
and examines the important proviso concluding subsection (b) of § 1367, that
particular situations identified in the paragraph will be ineligible for supplemental
jurisdiction "when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would
be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332."'
In the comment that follows, Professor David L. Shapiro offers an inside view
of Supreme Court argument in the pivotal case, Finley v. United States."
Professor Shapiro contrasts his perspective when arguing the case for the United
States with his scholarly look at the Court's opinion in Finley and at the future of
supplemental jurisdiction. 2 Then, Professor Arthur D. Wolf presents an overview
of the doctrinal and statutory periods making up federal supplemental jurisdiction
and discusses the particular effects of § 1367 in federal court abstentions. 3
Finally, Professor Stephen C. Yeazell combines a historical analysis of
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supplemental jurisdiction with thoughts on the planning and pedagogy of the
subject in a civil procedure course.'4
This is the richest and most important collection of writings ever assembled on
supplemental jurisdiction. I am enormously grateful to our scholars for their
contributions and to the editors of the Indiana Law Journal for their tireless
efforts to bring this issue together. I hope that readers find in this Symposium
both enlightenment and a sense of direction for the future.
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